China's changing role in industrial value chains - and reverberations on industrial actors in Germany by Jürgens, Ulrich & Rehbehn, Rolf
www.ssoar.info
China's changing role in industrial value chains -
and reverberations on industrial actors in Germany
Jürgens, Ulrich; Rehbehn, Rolf
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Jürgens, U., & Rehbehn, R. (2004). China's changing role in industrial value chains - and reverberations on industrial
actors in Germany. (Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt
Organisationen und Wissen, Forschungsgruppe Wissen, Produktionssysteme und Arbeit, 2004-302). Berlin:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-196738
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
       WZB – discussion paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ulrich Jürgens, Rolf Rehbehn   
 
 
China’s Changing Role in Industrial Value Chains –  
and Reverberations on Industrial Actors in Germany 
 
 
 
SP III 2004-302 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
juergens@wz-berlin.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZITIERWEISE/CITATION: 
 
 
Ulrich Jürgens, Rolf Rehbehn 
 
China’s Changing Role in Industrial Value Chains – and Reverberations on Industrial Actors in 
Germany 
Discussion Paper SP III 2003-302 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (2003) 
 
 
 
Forschungsschwerpunkt:   Research Area: 
Organisationen und    Organizations and  
Wissen      Knowledge 
 
 
 
Forschungsgruppe:    Research Group: 
Wissen, Produktionssysteme   Knowledge, Production Systems 
und Arbeit     and Work 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) 
Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin 
Telefon: +49 30 25491-201, Fax: +49 30 25491-209 
www.wz-berlin.de/ow/wpa 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The paper addresses the position occupied by China in the new international 
division of labour now developing as value chains become increasingly frag-
mented and work is relocated in the context of globalisation. China is currently 
experiencing an extremely dynamic industrialisation process, and worldwide 
foreign direct investment in industry is concentrating strongly in the People’s 
Republic. A comparative study of developments in the automotive and infocom 
industries examines a number of issues. Firstly, differences in development dy-
namics and corporate strategy in the two industries are examined. Secondly, 
the demands multinational companies make of their locations in China and their 
supplier structures are investigated. Thirdly, differences in the “embedding” of 
the new multinational company locations in China are investigated. Particularly 
interesting is the development of territorially integrated production clusters and 
the role of industrial parks. The fourth issue to be looked at is the impact of de-
velopments in China on actors and locations in Germany. 
Zusammenfassung 
Im Zentrum des Papers steht die Frage nach der Position Chinas in der neuen 
internationalen Arbeitsteilung, die sich gegenwärtig als Folge der zunehmenden 
Fragmentierung von Wertschöpfungsketten und der Verlagerung von Arbeit im 
Zuge der Globalisierung herausbildet. Dabei wird von der Beobachtung ausge-
gangen, dass in China gegenwärtig ein äußerst dynamischer Industrialisie-
rungsprozess stattfindet und sich die weltweiten industriellen Direktinvestitionen 
in hohem Maße auf China konzentrieren. In einer vergleichenden Untersuchung 
von Entwicklungen in der Automobilindustrie und der InfoCom-Industrie wird 
den folgenden vier Fragen nachgegangen: Erstens werden Unterschiede in der 
Entwicklungsdynamik und in den Strategien der Unternehmen der beiden In-
dustrien betrachtet. Zweitens wird nach den Anforderungen hinsichtlich der 
Kompetenzen gefragt, die von den multinationalen Unternehmen an ihre Stand-
orte in China und ihre Zulieferstrukturen gestellt werden, untersucht. Drittens 
werden Unterschiede in der „Einbettung“ der neuen Standorte multinationaler 
Konzerne in China untersucht. Von besonderem Interesse ist in diesem Zu-
sammenhang die Entstehung territorial integrierter Produktionscluster und die 
Rolle von Industrieparks. Viertens geht es um die Frage, welche Konsequenzen 
sich aus der Entwicklung in China für Akteure und Standorte in Deutschland 
ergeben. 
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 1. Introduction 
One of the most marked characteristics of globalisation has been the dynamic 
restructuring of industrial value chains.1 This restructuring has been both a ma-
jor driver of globalisation while itself being driven by globalisation. The outsourc-
ing of corporate functions leading to greater specialisation and fragmentation in 
value chains and the off-shoring of activities are the main features of this trans-
formation. It creates risks and opportunities for corporate and political actors 
and its evolution is highly uncertain for all parties. A state of equilibrium in a new 
international division of labour is not yet apparent.  
In this restructuring process, China2 has been playing a more and more 
dominant role since the middle of the last decade. Explanatory factors are state 
policies explicitly designed to attract and regulate foreign direct investment and 
the dynamic growth of demand on the domestic market. But these factors do 
not suffice to explain the size and speed of international engagement in China. 
In analysing recent developments in the automotive and the infocom industries, 
the paper addresses four questions: 
1. What factors explain the central role of China in the most recent develop-
ments in restructuring industrial value chains? 
2. What characterises the “embedding” of new industrial structures and proc-
esses in China and what evidence is there for the development of capabili-
ties? 
3. What are the commonalities and differences between industries in this re-
gard? 
4. What are the consequences for industrial actors and locations in Ger-
many? 
The paper is explorative, trying to assess emerging trends. It draws on empirical 
research conducted by the authors on several occasions during short visits to 
China.3 The focus of discussion will be the so-called foreign invested enter-
prises (FIEs)4, i.e. foreign companies that have established productive busi-
nesses in China mostly in the form of joint ventures with Chinese partners. The 
development of purely Chinese companies is beyond the scope of this study. 
                                            
1  Cf. on the term „value chain“: Sturgeon (2001). 
2 In this paper China stands for the People's Republic of China. 
3 A one-week study tour by Ulrich Jürgens and H.-R. Meißner with company inter-
views in the supply chain of telecommunication companies in China in summer 
2002 and several study trips to China by Rolf Rehbehn between 1992 and 2001 as 
President of Quality Management, Siemens Communication Devices. 
4  Based on the "Law on Foreign-Capital Enterprises" of 1986 (Taylor et al. 2003, 
63). 
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 The paper is structured in a straightforward way. The following chapter dis-
cusses differences of industry organisation between the automotive and info-
com industries and provides some evidence of differences in the speed and 
direction of their engagement in China. The next chapter discusses capability 
development at Chinese locations within the transnational production networks 
of multinational companies. It provides evidence of fast upgrading of compe-
tence levels. The relevance of industrial parks as an instrument for “embedding” 
multinational operations in the Chinese socio-political context is highlighted as a 
particularly important factor.  
The fourth chapter deals with some consequences for home countries dis-
cussed against the background of the debate on the future of industry in Ger-
many. The paper ends with a brief summary and conclusions.  
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 2. Comparing Industry Dynamics in the 
Automotive and the InfoCom Industries 
China seems to present an almost clean sheet for global corporations in decid-
ing how to organise their global value chains. And China certainly offers consid-
erable advantages in terms of wages and salaries. Figure 1 provides some in-
formation about labour costs which is certainly one of the general factors ex-
plaining China’s advantage. 
Figure 1: Salaries/Month in China, Taiwan, and Japan of Selected 
Occupation Groups (in US Dollars) 
 India China Singapore Taiwan Japan USA
CEO 1,764 2,865 11,131 13,638 18,300 31,200
Manufacturing 
Director 
937 1,866 6,740 6,986 12,045 11,592
Factory/Plant 
Manager 
724 1,399 4,639 6,036 7,992 8,052
Systems 
Engineer 
490 746 2,290 2,573 4,663 5,460
Production 
Supervisor 
384 589 1,847 2,253 3,485 3,917
Secretary 176 393 1,326 1,415 1,720 2,208
Chauffeur 147 279 975 1,520 1,217 2,442
Source: ASIAWEEK 2000 
Labour costs, however, are not sufficient to explain the rush into China. Neither 
the timing nor the speed of relocation (off-shoring) can be explained by this fac-
tor alone. Both automotive and infocom activities have developed at a breath-
taking speed in China over the last five to ten years. Some illustrative facts and 
figures may suffice to recall this well-known phenomenon: 
In the auto industry, sales of passenger cars in 2003 exceeded the previous 
year by more than 80%. The global players in the industry have rushed into 
China – almost all with major investment projects to set up or expand opera-
tions there (Weider 2004; Goldman Sachs Global Equity Research 2003; Xing 
2002). In 2002 car manufacturers were planning investment projects of more 
than 2 million cars, doubling the existing capacity for passenger cars (Xing 
2002). In 23 provinces and cities new automotive factories are currently under 
construction (Sieren 2003). “Looking ahead”, states the China Industry Devel-
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 opment Report5 on the Auto Industry in China 2003, “opportunities are enor-
mous in auto industry. In the next 10 to 15 years, China will become the largest 
auto market in the world (…). By then, annual auto production could reach 
17 million units and registered autos 100 million units” (The Ministry of Science 
and Technology 2002). Obviously, there are all the indications of a bubble situa-
tion at this stage.  
In view of the growth situation in China, the development of the Chinese 
auto industry has been geared to the domestic market. But this is about to 
change. At Volkswagen (VW) it is expected that, within the next three years, 
10% of Chinese VW production can be exported, and that exports will play an 
important role in the future. More important, however, will be the export of parts. 
General Motors wants to buy US$ 10 billion worth of parts per year from China, 
and GM and Ford are pushing their suppliers to open factories in China. Ameri-
can manufacturers are particular keen to benefit from the low-cost conditions in 
China.6 Indeed, the export of car components from China is increasing rapidly. 
In 2003 China exported US$ 2.4 billion in car parts, up from US$ 1.8 billion in 
2002. But this is a small amount compared to the annual car parts export target 
of US$ 70 billion to US$ 100 billion set by the Chinese government for 2010 
(Murphy 2004).  
To attain this goal, the Chinese parts industry will have to improve their cost 
and quality levels considerably. At present they are hardly competitive on the 
global market. “Most of the country’s 1,500 or so car-parts makers of a decent 
scale have bloated pay rolls, outdated manufacturing equipment or little experi-
ence mass-producing parts with the rapid design changes that U.S. automakers 
routinely make,” a buyer of the Big Three is quoted in an article of Wall Street 
Journal Europe (Shirouzu 2003).7 A report by the Boston Consulting Group puts 
the cost disadvantages resulting from these inefficiencies in the supply sectors 
at between 10% and 20% for large established joint ventures and up to 40% for 
smaller car companies in China (The Boston Consulting Group 2002). 
Greater competitiveness on international markets is one of the main goals 
of the new Automotive Industry Development Policy formally declared by the 
Chinese government in 2004. The new policy reconfirms the goal that the 
automotive industry should become a “pillar industry” of China by 2010 and, as 
such, will remain under the macro-level control of the central government. The 
new policy encourages consolidation in the industry from currently more than 
120 to only a few major corporations. The policy also states that the Chinese 
                                            
5 The China Industrial Development Reports are provided on the basis of “joint ef-
forts by China Economic Information Network, government ministries, industrial 
associates and research institute specialists they are designed to serve corporate 
leaders in policy making” (http://ce.cei.gov.cn/e_report/index.htm). 
6  (“The rush to source automotive parts from China has turned into a stampede”, 
writes G. Mercer from McKinsey.) “Sourcing from China, the Organisational Chal-
lenge”, in: Automotive & Assembly Newsletter, 31.7.2003 
7  “It is such a concern”, the article continues, “that Ford has decided to build parts – 
receiving centers in the U.S. to verify the quality of goods being shipped from 
China and other low-cost countries.” (Shirouzu 2003) 
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 automotive industry should develop so that it is competitive both domestically 
and internationally, and eliminates inefficiency and low quality (Auto Industry 
2004). 
The automotive industry has followed the infocom industry in its rush into 
China. While the latter had started its frantic development in the second half of 
the 1990s, the automotive industry has been accelerating only since 2002. The 
development of the infocom industry has thus been even more dynamic, dis-
playing not only many similarities but also differences. China seems on its way 
to becoming the world’s main production base for electronics parts. While elec-
tronics production in emerging markets will nearly double – from US$ 65 billion 
in 2001 to US$ 125 billion by 2005, China will take the lion’s share of this 
growth, 77%. It will increase its share in global electronics production from 8% 
to 14% according to a study by the International Finance Corporation and Booz 
Allen Hamilton (2003). The study concludes: “China will continue to hold com-
manding positions in key value chain elements such as assembly, displays, and 
semiconductors, as it evolves into the hub of electronics manufacturing.” Re-
search by the Japan Electronics and Information Technology Association 
(JEITA, 2003) indicates that China including Hong Kong is expected to be the 
top producer of eight out of twelve key electronic products in 2003. China is 
likely to produce 41% of all DVD-Rom drives, 62% of all DVD players, 37% of 
desktop personal computers, 27% of colour televisions and 30% of mobile 
phones. 
Within a few years China has become one of the major world exporters of 
communication equipment. In fact, China became the United States’ number-
one supplier of high-tech goods ahead of Japan in 2002 (http://www. 
pcb007.com, News of 13 August 2003). And the China Industry Development 
Report on the communications equipment manufacturing sector in China 2003 
expected: “that communications equipment manufacturers would be going 
global, that imports will fall further in the next few years. Domestic manufacturer 
capabilities were greatly enhanced. Many high-end equipment could be made 
independently in mass production. Sino-foreign joint ventures, with the increas-
ing perfection in R&D, would become production basis to meet global demand”. 
(China Economic Information Network 2003) 
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 3. Requirements for Capability Development 
and Infrastructure of Chinese Locations 
3.1 Capability Development  
Driven by globalisation as well as technology changes, restructuring in the info-
com industry has been a particularly dynamic process. The shift of value-added 
from final producers to component makers has serious effects on cost and em-
ployment structures. Thus, in the case of the infocom industry, suppliers now 
account for 85% of production costs, and in the case of the car industry their 
share is around 70%. In any case, achieving cost advantages and assuring 
consistent, robust quality performance throughout the value chain has become 
a primary concern for final producers in both industries. Up to now, final pro-
ducers have mostly relied on pressuring suppliers to reduce prices. In the fu-
ture, more emphasis will be laid on coordinating processes and integrating sup-
pliers more closely, and on harmonizing processes across interorganisational 
interfaces. The consequences are far reaching changes in company organiza-
tion and management. Process organisation and the evenness of flows in the 
whole value chain have gained priority over improvements realisable at certain 
stages within the chain. At the same time, deverticalization requires all compa-
nies regardless of size and national or multinational status to find new re-
sponses in each of the four fundamental dimensions 
• time: cycle time, response time, time to market; 
• costs: personnel costs, production costs, administration costs; 
• capital: capital turnover, capital productivity, capital allocation; 
• quality: non-conformity costs, process quality, product quality, service qual-
ity. 
Improvements have to be made simultaneously in all four dimensions with par-
ticular emphasis on quality, however. In any case, competition in both the 
automotive and infocom industries will take place between whole process 
chains and not between single companies focusing on their internal organisation 
and, in particular, on manufacturing. At the same time, the actual value chains 
will not evolve into solid organisational structures but remain flexible to allow 
shifting partial processes in response to changing company strategies. 
Capabilities of Local Suppliers 
In the past, the primary corporate potential for improving productivity was seen 
in the production area. Rationalisation thus concentrated on production. The 
same is true for quality. Quality has been related to production and was identi-
fied with product quality. However, seeing that around 70% of the causes for 
failing to meet quality requirements are not attributable to final producer in-
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 house production, in both the car and the infocom industries, the essential im-
provement potential has to be realised outside the production areas of these 
companies, i.e., either at the product development stage or at suppliers. In-
creasingly, suppliers are also attaining greater responsibility in areas such as 
product development, production planning and logistics. Last but not least, focal 
companies expect their suppliers to follow them to their foreign locations and 
supply operations there in the just-in-time mode and with consistent quality. As 
a consequence, suppliers have followed their end customers in setting up op-
erations in China. This requires both financial power and a high degree of “sys-
tem competence” on the part of suppliers.  
This close integration between processes of the final producers and their 
suppliers increases specialisation among the latter while increasing their de-
pendence on the former. The technology of the end product determines the 
level of the technological capability which has to be mastered by local suppli-
ers.8 In China, this capabilities requirement is supported by a Chinese govern-
ment policy requesting companies investing in China to bring in their latest gen-
eration technology and requiring them to achieve a certain level of local content 
and exports after a given period.9 Local content requirement, however, had to 
be abolished when China entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in late 
2001. 
In the infocom industry, technological developments have strongly sup-
ported the trend towards shifting value-added functions to suppliers, primarily in 
the compression of additional functions into integrated circuits or components. 
This in turn requires changes in casing technology. Both developments, espe-
cially under pressure from the dramatic speed of product innovation, has lead to 
the restructuring of production. One of the main consequences is greater auto-
mation. Whereas in 1980 only 40% of all components were fitted automatically 
worldwide, today the figure is over 90%. Consequently, manufacturers have 
increased the level of automation in China, too, foregoing some of the advan-
tages of lower labour costs in direct areas. Labour cost advantages remain in 
the indirect areas, however. Another consequence is the opening-up of product 
architectures following the example of the PC industry. A result of open product 
architecture is the high degree of standardisation now attainable in production. 
This allows outsourcing and off-shoring of production to electronic manufactur-
ing service (EMS) companies, so-called contract manufacturers. (cf. Lüthje et 
al. 2002; Borrus et al. 2001) 
The enormous growth of a group of multinational contract manufacturers in 
the electronics industry since the second half of the 1990s is among the re-
markable phenomena to be observed in the restructuring of value chains in the 
electronics industry. Figure 2 gives an impression of this dynamic. It shows the 
development of employment in leading international contract manufacturers. 
                                            
8  Cf. on related conceptual issues Ernst and Kim (2001). 
9  Cf. on the automotive policy of the Chinese government: Harwit (2001). 
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 Figure 2: Employment Developments at Selected Contract Manufacturers 
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Source: Jürgens et al. (2002, 216) 
Contract manufacturers, including all the companies listed in figure 2, are not 
surprisingly among the fastest growing FIEs in China. In the automotive indus-
try, the contract manufacturer business model still plays a marginal role. 
The Outsourcing of Production in the Infocom Industry 
The standardisation of product interfaces in the infocom industry has meant that 
manufacturing equipment is now being offered by only a handful of manufactur-
ers worldwide, so that there are hardly any differences between manufacturers 
in production processes. Only in final assembly and functional testing can they 
distinguish themselves from competitors. This explains why capital-intensive 
production processes in the infocom industry – following the Wintelist model10 – 
are no longer regarded as a core competence of final producers.  
Whether production follows the markets, exploits local cost advantages, or 
is assigned to contract manufacturers is a question of corporate strategy. All 
three cases apply to the Chinese situation. 
                                            
10 Cf. on the model of Wintelism Borrus and Zysman (1997); Jürgens and Sablowski 
(2003). In the traditional industrial company the production function is regarded as 
a central area of competence. It is mainly in the area of production that, technically 
and organisationally, the advantages of “economies of scale and scope” can be 
mobilised. “Production” is no longer a core competence in the Wintelist model, 
however. Core functions here are research and development, and marketing and 
sales, while manufacturing is tending to be regarded as “dead weight”, as a bur-
den for the balance sheet and a risk in view of the high market fluctuations and 
short product cycles. The Wintelist company, ideally, is “fabless”. 
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 In the past, it has often been argued that product development and series 
production should be located at the same site for reasons of know-how transfer 
and product monitoring. At least for the infocom industry, this argument is no 
longer valid for two reasons. First, decisions on production location may have to 
be made flexibly and at short notice, and, second, markets require new product 
generations to be introduced simultaneously in different plants worldwide, so 
that product launches have to occur in parallel at many sites. This can be 
achieved only if the company has full control over the whole process from the 
early product development stage to final assembly. Various factors have con-
tributed to an increase in demand for higher functionality and quality in China, 
necessitating a better infrastructure and greater competence at Chinese loca-
tions. They include local market demand for first-generation products; insistence 
by the Chinese government that companies introduce their new technologies 
when investing in China; and the expectation of multinational companies that 
their Chinese locations will reach world market standards, allowing them to ex-
port their products. Mastering this competence development defines the de-
mands being made on the infrastructure at Chinese production locations. 
In the early 1990s, the standard of production location infrastructure was 
low. Second or even third generation level technologies were being used in 
keeping with the low standards of national markets. Affiliates were closely inte-
grated into the international corporate structure. Technological competences 
were concentrated at headquarters from where they were transferred to the for-
eign locations.  
In the case of the infocom industry, this situation has meanwhile changed. 
While technology competence remains at headquarters, local adaptation engi-
neering and product monitoring, including responsibility for the quality of mate-
rial purchased in Asia and the quality of the end product have become a local 
responsibility. This upgrading of demands and capabilities is true not only for 
Siemens and other brand-name infocom industries but also for component sup-
pliers. The automotive industry is lagging behind this development. Figure 3 
shows the situation of local affiliates of a number of international companies 
operating in China with regard to market strategy, capability level, and local 
competence – based on our own research. It should be noted that all compa-
nies are either fully or partially owned by international companies. Purely Chi-
nese companies currently play only a marginal role supplying low-tech parts in 
high-tech production chains. 
Of the eleven companies, only Volkswagen with its Chinese operations 
produced almost exclusively for the Chinese market. However, the company 
has recently begun to export small numbers of cars to other East Asian markets 
on a trial basis. The majority of companies of the infocom sector we investi-
gated produce for the international market. Some are in the process of system-
atically increasing the capability of their Chinese operations to develop them 
into centres of competence, a level which had already been attained by four 
companies at the time of our research. A centre of competence usually bears 
region-wide responsibilities with regard to economic results, product planning 
(road map) and distribution. 
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 Figure 3: Market Strategy and Capability Levels of Selected Infocom and 
Automotive Companies in China (2002) 
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Legend: 
Company Ownership Product 
1. Meadvill 100% Meadvill USA Info Com PCB 
2. Siemens Network 
Solution German-Chinese JV Info Com 
3. Siemens Mobile German-Chinese JV Info Com 
4. AMD 100% AMD USA Info Com Components 
5. Lite on Electronic 100 % Lite on Taiwan Info Com Components 
6. TMCOM Panasonic Japanese-Chinese JV Info Com Components 
7. Fujitsu Media Device 100% Fujitsu Japan Info Com Components 
8. Solectron 100% Solectron USA Info Com Contr. Manuf. 
9. ACP Electronic Taiwanese -Chinese JV Info Com PCB 
10. VW  German-Chinese JV Automotive 
11. GM German-Chinese JV Automotive 
Source: Based on research of Rolf Rehbehn and Frieder Naschold in 1999 and Ulrich 
Jürgens and Heinz-Rudolf Meißner in 2002 
All companies listed in Figure 3 showed above-average performance in process 
control, meaning a high and consistent production yield throughout 21 shifts per 
week. Combined with low wage levels in both direct and indirect areas this af-
fords considerable cost advantages. They are only slightly offset by lower pro-
ductivity levels.  
While infocom products have been designed for world markets since the 
end of the 1990s – and this is true for both final products and components – 
automotive products are still focusing on regional markets. In product and proc-
ess technology, multinational auto companies still tend not to transfer their lat-
est technology to China. At Volkswagen, for instance, when the new Golf V was 
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 being introduced in Germany in 2003, the Changchun plant started production 
of its forerunner, the Golf IV in the same year. But this policy seems to be 
changing. The Touran, the van model built on the Golf platform, was introduced 
in Germany as recently as March 2003, and production at the Shanghai site 
started in 2004. At the same time the production of the old Brazilian designed 
Santana has been moved from its Shanghai site to a Chinese contract manu-
facturer. 
In general, as in the case of Volkswagen, multinational car companies have 
not pursued a policy of developing their Chinese locations into export bases 
within their global production network or into competence centres for specific 
company functions. For these companies, the Chinese operations serve the 
national Chinese market only or, in some cases, they are seen as part of a re-
gional strategy to serve markets in East Asia. There is one notably exception, a 
new Honda factory in Guangzhou which will start operations in 2005. This plant 
is to produce cars only for export, specifically targeting the European market. 
Honda’s Guangzhou plant will have to demonstrate the ability of China-based 
car manufacturing “to climb the value chain” (Murphy 2004). As an exclusively 
export-oriented company, Honda Guanzhou is not subject to the 50:50 rule for 
joint ventures and is the only FIE among carmakers to retain full managerial 
responsibility for its operations. 
The situation is different in the infocom industry. There have been signifi-
cant changes since the beginning of 2000. First generation high-technology 
products need special local support in this sector. Local product development 
teams have accordingly been set up, not primarily composed of expatriates but 
explicitly aiming to recruit local personnel, if possible trained in Western coun-
tries or with international experience. These changes in local infrastructure are 
supported by low wage costs in both direct and indirect areas. It goes without 
saying that engineering for local adaptations is now being carried out locally. 
But main product development activities are still restricted to home country 
headquarters.  
Siemens Shanghai Mobile is a good example. The Chinese affiliate pro-
duced 14 million mobile phones in the fiscal year 2001/2002, accounting for 
40% of total Siemens AG mobile production. 8 million were exported mainly to 
Asian countries. Due to increased pressure on costs and profit margins, this 
activity has been outsourced step by step. The company is now focusing more 
and more on R&D and the production of networks for third generation mobile 
communication. As a consequence, the Chinese business unit is evolving into a 
centre of competence responsible for product development, production market-
ing and financial results. General Electric and Sharp were both planning to ex-
pand their production operations and establish centres for research and devel-
opment in 2002, thus developing in the same direction as Siemens. 
This development is typical for the orientation of large multinational infocom 
companies in China, and, as we have seen, is reflected in foreign trade statis-
tics for high-tech products. Five trends are apparent: 
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 A first trend is the establishment of competence centres in China by an in-
creasing number of multinational infocom companies. American companies, 
General Electric and Motorola, the German Siemens group and the South Ko-
rean company Samsung Electronics are among the pioneers in China in this 
regard.11  
A second trend is in the focus of investment. Whereas investment used to 
go mainly into manufacturing, the service sector is now gaining in importance. 
This is true for maintenance functions, repair services, and for marketing and 
finance. 
A third new trend concerns the “system orientation” of projects pursued by 
multinational companies with their investment in China. Companies are now 
planning their projects with a view to integration into their global business 
strategies from the outset.  
A fourth new trend is in corporate governance. Whereas most past invest-
ment was in the former joint ventures with equal shares of foreign and Chinese 
partners, foreign companies are increasingly able to obtain licences as majority 
shareholders or as 100% foreign-owned affiliates.  
A fifth trend is the establishment of regional headquarters by global players 
in China. At present, more than 20 global players have set up local headquar-
ters. In Shanghai, more than 70 global players have established regional head-
quarters, including leading multinationals like Alcatel, General Electric, Micro-
soft, and Siemens. 
To a large extent, developments in the automotive industry are displaying 
the same trends. A marked difference, however, lies in the degree to which 
Chinese operations are integrated into the global business strategies of the mul-
tinational companies. Chinese affiliates are restricted to national or regional 
strategy. Another difference is due to regulation. For the automobile companies 
(OEMs) the 50:50 rule still holds also under the new automotive policy issued in 
2004. However, this rule has been rescinded for automotive suppliers, including 
car engine production. On the whole, government regulation seems to play a 
stronger role in the automotive industry (cf. Harwit 1995). Of particular impor-
tance in the context of our discussion are regulations on technology transfer 
and research and development (R&D). Thus, the new automotive policy direc-
tive not only sets a minimum investment level for new passenger vehicles en-
terprises of Rmb 2 billion but requires that a R&D facility be established with an 
minimum investment of Rmb 800 million.12 There is no local content regulation 
any longer, which would no longer have been possible after China’s accession 
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) – but new investment projects are re-
quired to include engine production, which would ensure a minimum of 40% 
local production anyway. In contrast to the original draft, the new policy does 
not oblige foreign investors to transfer technology to Chinese local manufactur-
                                            
11  Thus, Siemens intends to increase its turnover in China to € 11 billion, this is more 
than 10% of the total turnover of the group. 
12  Exchange rate of August 2003: 1 China Yuan Renminbi = € 0.110908.  
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 ers. The aim is rather to foster local technology development through the growth 
of domestic research and development centres. 
In brief, China has successfully established itself in recent years as a lead-
ing centre of production worldwide in many areas of the infocom industry, and in 
a number of cases is developing further to the level of competence centres. We 
now go on to look at one of the factors supporting this development which we 
regard as highly important in explaining the astonishingly smooth insertion of 
multinational activities into a foreign culture and a socialist political-economic 
context. 
3.2 The Relevance of Industrial Parks 
A major factor explaining the extent and speed of China's recent industrial de-
velopment is the industrial park concept. The development began with the 
opening of special economic zones in the coastal regions of China in the 1980s 
(Debresson et al. 2002; Chang 1998). Since the early 1990s, the industrial-park 
concept has been an explicit vehicle for modernising the Chinese economy. By 
early 2000, industrial parks had proved to be highly efficient in attracting foreign 
companies, allowing them to set up their operations at breathtaking speed. 
Building on the experience with industrial parks gathered in the Small Tiger 
Economies during the 1990s, the concept has become an element in a state-led 
modernisation policy of a socialist country. Industrial parks appear to have of-
fered multinational companies such ideal conditions that they have attracted 
these companies in great numbers. 
There is only scant information about the recent industrial park movement 
in China.13 The following information is therefore largely based on Internet 
sources. 
After China set up first four and then five special economic zones in the 
1980s, all kinds of development zones followed in their wake.14 Only a limited 
number of all these parks have attracted foreign direct investment (FDI). A 
                                            
13 Cf. Xiaojuan (2003); cf. the business guide published by China Knowledge Press 
(2002). 
14 The establishment of industrial parks was restricted to certain areas. In 1984 13 
"coastal open cities" were designated to create “Economic and Technological 
Development Zones” (ETDZs). 14 ETDZs were approved, followed by a further 18 
in the early 1990s. China now has a total of 54 state-led ETDZs. Including local 
zones, more than 4,000 assorted ETDZs exist (China-Britain Business Council 
2003). The industrial-park concepts in a wider definition includes the "High and 
New Technology Development Zones" initiated by a high-tech park programme of 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). By the end of 2001 there were 
53 HTPs. It also includes the free trade zones (FTZs) which began in Shanghai at 
the beginning of the 1990s. There are now 15 such zones. More recently, export 
processing zones (EPZs) have been created, of which there are now 17. In 
addition there are border trade co-operation zones, software-development parks 
and university-science parks. 
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 business guide published by China Knowledge Press (2002) lists around 270 
parks in the whole of China.15 A list provided by the law consultant firm Leh-
mann, Lee & Xu (2002) contains names and short descriptions of altogether 
174 industrial parks. 
The establishment of Science and Technology Industrial Parks (STIPs) was 
decided by the Chinese government at the beginning of the 1990s to speed up 
development of high-tech industries. In August 1988, China's National High and 
New Technology Industrial Development Plan, the TORCH Programme, was 
put into effect. Since 1991, 53 science and technology industrial parks have 
been approved as National STIPs by the State Council. 
According to this programme, the STIPs should function as: 
“(1) a base to nurture and develop high and new technology industry; 
(2) a demonstration center for speeding up transfer of R&D achievements to produc-
tion and technological innovation to enterprise; 
(3) an experimental zone for institutional reform and innovation; 
(4) a center displaying how S & T is relied on to boost trade and China opening to 
the outside world; 
(5) a school for cultivating high-tech enterprises and entrepreneurs; 
(6) a source of radiation to apply high and new technology to updating traditional in-
dustry; 
(7) a new community that embodies modern civilisation of socialism.” 
(China Internet Information Center 2002a) 
In 1997 ten STIPs in China have opened up to APEC members. In 2000 the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) jointly identified 20 STIPs as “National 
High-tech Export Bases”. 
By 2000 there were altogether 20,796 enterprises in the STIPs. They em-
ployed 2.51 million workers, including 560,000 scientists and engineers. By 
2005, according to this report, total revenue from technology transfer, industrial 
product and trade will be doubled to Rmb 1,700 billion (€ 189 billion)16, and total 
value of industrial production Rmb 1,400 billion. By 2010 the report expects that 
total STIPs revenue will constitute 20% of the total industrial increase in national 
GDP and 20% of national exports (China Internet Information Center 2002a). 
A report by “National Science & Technology Industrial Parks of China” 
(2000) summarises the development of the STIPs in the first decade: “After 10 
years of construction and development, the new and high-tech zones have 
made gigantic progress in reform and development, in construction of an inno-
vative system and of the enterprise incubation capacity, in fostering innovative 
                                            
15  Industrial parks play an important role also in other South East Asian economies. 
According to a compilation of worldwide industrial parks by GlobalManufac-
turer.net Taiwan alone has more than 80 individual industrial districts, science 
parks and export processing areas with more than 20 under construction and even 
more in the planning stage. 
16 Exchange rate August 2003: 1 China Yuan Renminbi = € 0.110908 . 
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 personnel and in making important contributions to obtaining the second-stage 
strategic objective of China's socialist modernisation drive.” The New and High-
tech Zones “have promoted the reforms of property rights, distribution, labor, 
personnel and social security systems and the establishment of a modern en-
terprise system.” (China Internet Information Center 2002b) 
Obviously, the STIPs have played a central role in developing a high-tech 
industry in China. For an example of the enormous dynamic and potential of this 
development we will take a brief look at the – admittedly outstanding – example 
of the Suzhou Industrial Park. 
The Suzhou Industrial Park was founded in 1994 as a joint venture between 
the Chinese and Singapore governments, adopting Singapore’s experience in 
economic development and public administration. SIP has a total area of 70 
square kilometres; in the first phase an area of 12 square kilometres was devel-
oped. When fully developed, it will accommodate a population of 600,000 and 
provide 360,000 jobs.  
The Suzhou Industrial Park had attracted over 764 foreign enterprises by 
mid-2002, a cumulative total contractual investment of US$ 13.4 billion and util-
ized contractual investment of US$ 4.9 billion (the aim is to secure 
US$ 10 billion in actual foreign investment within the next three years). Located 
in the park are 81 companies from the global fortune 500 and 63% of the pro-
jects recorded more than US$ 100 million in investment. Of all projects accumu-
lated up to November 2001, 45% were financed by European and American 
investors, 26% by Singapore investors, and 12% by Japanese and South Ko-
rean investors. The IT sector alone absorbed 43% of foreign investment pro-
jects. 
The Suzhou Industrial Park is run by a joint venture company (originally 
50:50, since 2000 65% held by Chinese and 35% by a Singapore-led consor-
tium). The park administration provides services in every stage as a “one-stop 
shop” (plant construction, labour recruitment, business administration). Compa-
nies only rent the premises for their operations and can focus investment on 
equipment and machinery. The park has established a computer-based cus-
toms declaration and taxation system, a human resources centre, real estate 
consultant market, and a number of finance and public accounting firms. An 
export processing zone (EPZ) enables companies to bypass many customs 
restrictions. 
Industrial parks for foreign companies setting up operations in China offer a 
number of valuable services and functions: 
(1) Administrative support: the administrative organs of the new and high-
tech zones on the basis of the TORCH Programme are granted “provincial-level 
management powers” regarding planning, construction, land use, finance, in-
dustrial and commercial administration, taxation, examination and approval of 
projects, labour and personnel, and imports and exports.” (China Internet Infor-
mation Center 2002b). Rather than establishing a bureaucratic structure, em-
phasis is laid on streamlining administrative structures, strengthening service 
and simplifying formalities (“small organs and extensive service”). 
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 (2) Tax reductions and preferential arrangements: the TORCH Programme 
specified preferential conditions such as reduced income tax, provision of spe-
cial financing sources etc. The individual parks are increasingly competing to 
offer special conditions in order to attract investors. The following list provides 
an example of the preferential policies of the Automobile Parts and Components 
Production Park located in the Dalian Development Area: 
a. Land Price: most favourable price will be given to the projects in the 
Park 
b. Income Tax: 15% income tax rate is adopted, in addition, two years ex-
emption (start from making profit) and subsequent three years reduction 
(rate of 7.5%) will be given. 
c. Local Income Tax: 3% income tax rate is adopted, and seven years ex-
emption will be given. 
d. VAT (value-added tax): rate of 17%. 
e. Land Appreciation Tax and Factory Building Purchase Deed Tax: free. 
f. Profit Remittance Tax: free. 
g. Individual Income Tax: rate of 5-45%, after Rmb 1,200 deductions for 
Chinese employees and Rmb 4,000 for foreign expatriates. 
h. Workers Recruit Policy: the urgently needed technical and managerial 
staff and their families could be recruited from outside of Dalian without 
paying for Residents Multiply Fee. 
i. Production Equipment Depreciation: enterprises in the Park could have 
the shortest production equipment depreciation period in accordance 
with State regulations. 
j. Other Policy: enterprises in the Park could have related financial support 
guaranteed by SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) Bank. 
Source: http://www.dalian.gov.cn/i18n/en/investment/2203_10216.jsp – downld. Sep-
tember 4, 2003 
(3) Human resource management support: human resource management 
seems an easy task for companies in the industrial park context. All of the man-
agers we interviewed at seven manufacturers located in four different industrial 
parks in June 2002 underlined that a number of human resource functions were 
taken care of by the industrial park very efficiently. Thus, despite the speed of 
the build up of employment, recruitment went smoothly. And in some cases 
there were large numbers of recruits to be handled. One of the companies at 
the Suzhou Industrial Park had started operations in 1997; at the time of our 
visit the company employed 3,500 and the plan for the following year was to 
increase the workforce by another 1,400. This enormous intake of new person-
nel took place while many companies in the park were looking for personnel 
also. The short time span over which the parks were set up meant that, in many 
cases, up to a hundred thousand new employees had to be brought in within 
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 only a few years. All companies emphasized the quality of university and tech-
nical schools education at establishments many of which had been founded 
only when the industrial parks themselves were set up. Some companies have 
contracts with certain technical schools, often recruiting whole school classes 
after graduation. 
The hiring routine at company APC in Suzhou’s municipal industrial park 
further demonstrates the ease of dealing with labour: "The local government 
has a human resource data base. Their human resource department picks up 
people from there. A human market exists – an open space where companies 
have a booth with a banner. At a certain date of the month job seekers come 
and in some cases job interviews are carried out right on the spot. Common 
factor for companies is to go to a school and interview students in this school. 
Our company has a contract with certain schools to hire each year a certain 
number. Here in China you hire a lot and also fire a lot." (Interview June 19, 
2002) 
As this quote indicates, there is no problem in hiring and firing individual 
workers. However, there is no experience as yet with how larger-scale redun-
dancies can be handled. 
In view of rapid population growth, many workers live in dormitories estab-
lished in the industrial park. In the case of the Kunshan industrial park, home of 
another company we visited, the population of the local town of Kunshu has 
increased within a couple of years from 600,000 to 800,000; 200,000 come from 
outside the area and most live in dormitories. 
(3) Industrial relations: last but not least, the local government and industrial 
park administration serve as a buffer in all questions of industrial relations. 
Again, all companies visited mentioned their satisfaction in this regard. There is 
no union representation in the plant. Labour union representatives are present 
in the local or provincial government and, as we have seen, for instance, park 
administrative organs control recruiting policy, and deal with employee com-
plaints. But grievances were apparently seldom articulated; at any rate, this was 
not a concern mentioned by the companies we visited. There is no interference 
by labour unions in operations management. The labour union also seemed not 
to exert influence in the area of wages. Low labour costs have, after all, been 
one of the motives for coming to China mentioned by most companies visited. 
This was even true for Taiwanese companies. Wages at one of the Taiwanese 
companies we visited were between 15% and 20% those paid on Taiwan. In 
any case, the union has not sought to obtain special wage increases from for-
eign companies. For instance, one of the American-owned electronic manufac-
turing service (EMS) firms we visited, set the base salary at 60% to 70% of the 
local market level. A bonus programme allowed only better performing employ-
ees to add a further 20% to 30%.  
In sum, it can be said that the industrial park movement has played an enor-
mously important role in China’s development into the world’s leading electron-
ics functional location. Industrial parks have played a key role in capability de-
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 velopment through close horizontal and vertical communication and cooperation 
within the industrial park. This development also demonstrates the great impor-
tance of capability development and competences of municipal and regional 
governments to manage the industrial parks and deal with multinational compa-
nies. 
3.3 Differences in Location Structures between the Two 
Industries 
The industry-park movement of the 1990s specifically aimed at attracting infor-
mation technology (IT) companies and did so with great success. By 2002 
about 50% to 80% of IT products were being produced by enterprises based in 
the New and High-tech Zones. Xiaojuan stresses the importance of the emer-
gence of FIE's industrial clusters as "a salient feature in China's effort to attract 
foreign direct investment" (Xiaojuan 2003, 23). "Judging from the trend", Xiao-
juan continues, "FIEs industrial clusters are emerging in more cities and regions 
in China. If this trend is allowed to continue, some Chinese cities are likely to 
become global manufacturing centers for some of the major industries." (ibid) 
A characteristic feature of the industrial clustering phenomenon in China is 
that certain cities have become leading centres for specific industries. Thus 
Dongguan, a small city in the Guangdong province, one of the earliest industrial 
clusters on the Chinese mainland, has become the leading desktop computer 
and computer parts manufacturing centre. The industrial chain in Dongguan is 
so complete that the city is able to supply 95% of all component parts needed to 
assemble a computer.17 
While the Dongguan cluster has focused on midlevel technologies, the 
Suzhou cluster has become the centre of laptop computer manufacturers re-
quiring high-tech capabilities and a better educated workforce. The higher tech-
nological level implies higher requirements for supplementary industries. Tai-
wanese investors have played by a central role for both the Dongguan and 
Suzhou industrial clusters. 
Due to special preferential policies to facilitate the growth of integrated cir-
cuit production, many local governments have assigned priority to integrated 
circuit production. The most massive FIE cluster in the integrated circuit industry 
has developed in Shanghai. Again, Taiwanese enterprises have taken the lion's 
share of this industrial cluster. 
Typically, these clusters encompass leading multinational companies in 
each of these industries, component manufacturers, often from Taiwan, and a 
range of contract manufacturers (EMS firms) offering general and specific 
                                            
17 “Of the importance of Dongguan’s IT manufacturing industry, an IBM vice presi-
dent remarked to the effect that a mere 15-minute traffic jam on the Dongguan-
Shenzhen express way is enough to cause worldwide fluctuations in computer 
prices!” (Xiaojuan 2003, 17). 
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 manufacturing functions. In many cases these component suppliers and EMS 
firms have been persuaded by the lead firms to set up their operations in the 
surroundings. For example, in the case of the FIE cluster in Shanghai, Motorola 
and Sony have both asked Taiwanese EMS to set up factories near their opera-
tions. 
A new type of industrial park is the Xingwang Industrial Garden established 
in Beijing in 2001. This "industrial garden" was set up mainly to serve Beijing 
Capitel Nokia Mobile Telecommunications, a joint venture between Nokia and 
its Chinese partner, the Capitel Group (to be referred to as Beijing Nokia). Bei-
jing Nokia produces and sells cellulous system equipment and digital mobile 
telephones in China. Nokia is one of the largest FIEs in China, and the com-
pany is a major exporter selling over 50% of its products to European and Asian 
countries. 
The Xingwang Park is China's first industrial cluster for mobile telecommu-
nication equipment encompassing the complete industrial chain. The Xingwang 
Park also is the first industrial park centring on one multinational lead company. 
Nokia, however, stresses that it does not object to companies operating in the 
park supplying its competitors with components, and invites other telecommuni-
cation companies to set up in the park. The aim of the park is to engage in re-
search and development, manufacturing, marketing, and services for mobile 
telecommunications products. By mid-2002, the park had already attracted fif-
teen renowned enterprises, including Sanyo lithium batteries, radio-frequency 
chips from Taiwan, precision integrated circuit boards, and Foxconn's produc-
tion and processing services as EMS. In the final stage more than 30 enter-
prises will be clustered in the park, creating more than 15,000 jobs. (Nokia.com, 
2001) 
The Xingwang (Nokia) Park is an important element in the strategy of the 
mother company to remain a manufacturer of mobile phones. The decision to 
set up the park was made against the backdrop of a global slump in demand for 
mobile phones and telecommunication equipment in general. All multinational 
companies had to cut back their workforces and lower their sales forecasts in 
this period. While Ericsson transferred its production of phones to a Singapor-
ean company, and Motorola expanded its outsourcing also to save costs, Nokia 
insisted on producing its handsets independently. By setting up its production 
operations in closest proximity to the supplementary companies in the industrial 
park and concentrating its worldwide production operations there, Nokia ex-
pects to realize the greatest manufacturing efficiencies.18 
Nokia has very consistently pursued the just-in-time industrial-park idea. 
Siemens is too small to follow this model. The Siemens Industrial Park located 
in the Pudong development area of Shanghai accommodates only few of its 
                                            
18  “It is Nokia’s hope that this mode of production will revolutionize and optimize the 
allocation of personnel, information, and circulation, raise efficiency and develop-
ment, production, management and the utilisation of resources, and achieve the 
goal of zero inventory through a sizable economic scale, thereby enhancing 
Nokia's competitiveness in both Chinese and global markets.” (Xiaojuan 2003, 22) 
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 suppliers. Other Siemens suppliers are located in Suzhou, or in Shenzhen prov-
ince. Motorola has tried to pursue the industrial-park idea, but a lack of business 
success induced the company to change its strategy and contract out a consid-
erable share of its products to original design manufacturers (ODMs), i.e. con-
tract manufacturers which design and produce complete products sold under 
Motorola’s name.  
As we have seen, the industrial park movement of the 1990s was aimed 
specifically at the information technology (IT) industry. Automotive activities 
have so far been marginal in these parks. Lehmann, Lee & Xu names 60 parks 
with activities in electronics, IT and related industries, but only 9 parks with 
automotive activities (http://www.lalawfirm.com.cn/links/hightech.htm). 
While in China an infocom company has thus assumed the leading role in 
setting up a modern industrial park operating on just-in-time principles, outside 
China this form of industrial organisation has so far primarily been the domain of 
the automotive industry. On the basis of experimental European and American 
projects in Latin America, industrial parks in this sector have been established 
primarily in Western Europe around carmaker assembly plants. Similarly, clus-
ters of R&D firms have formed around the development centres of auto manu-
facturers. (Jürgens 2003) 
Since the 1980s, after the central government had declared the automotive 
sector to be a key industry, a decentralized structure has developed in China 
owing to the ambition of individual provincial governments to form complete 
value chains in their provinces around the respective provincial champions. The 
resulting structures resembled the Japanese keiretsu. The establishment of joint 
ventures with Western carmakers induced the strategic suppliers of these firms 
to set up as FIEs in China, with the support and on the insistence of the auto-
motive firms. Since the joint venture principle initially applied, firms set up 
largely in existing regional structures. The creation of modern industrial parks in 
the vicinity of auto firm assembly plants is a very recent phenomenon.  
An important difference between the infocom and automotive industries is 
the size of components and modules to be supplied and the complexity of final 
assembly processes. The need for just-in-time delivery and the resulting reduc-
tion in transport costs are less urgent requirements in the infocom industry. This 
means that industrial parks can cluster suppliers (and contract manufacturers) 
of different final producers. Carmakers, in contrast, seek to form supplier clus-
ters that are as model-specific as possible and in the immediate vicinity of their 
own assembly locations. 
Another difference is that FIEs in the infocom sector have to rely on the 
group of internationally leading suppliers – especially from Taiwan and Japan – 
except for a very small percentage of simple components that can be provided 
by local Chinese firms. And it is these leading international firms that locate as 
FIEs in the industrial parks. Carmaker industrial parks designed on just-in-time 
principles, in contrast, bring together only a small group of strategic (module) 
suppliers, so-called first tier suppliers. Second, third, and fourth tier suppliers 
provide the first tier with the components they require.  
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 Such a structure has not yet developed in China. But many first tier suppli-
ers of multinational auto firms have meanwhile also set up as FIEs in China. 
These FIEs, as well as a small number of local Chinese producers, attain world 
class standards in terms of quality, as a benchmarking study on selected com-
ponents has shown. (Sutton 2004). The quality problem mentioned at the be-
ginning is, as this study shows, primarily a problem of local second tier and 
lower level suppliers.19  
In China, the establishment of international industrial parks to attract multi-
national automotive suppliers and develop integrated production complexes has 
not been promoted by central government but by provincial and municipal gov-
ernments, and only very recently. Particularly worth noting are the industrial 
park projects in Guangzhou, geared particularly to Japanese carmakers, and in 
Shanghai, where VW and General Motors have located. The Shanghai Interna-
tional Automobile City project, launched in 2001, and which is to be completed 
by 2010, is an especially interesting example.  
The project was founded by agreement between the city government and 
14 multinational and national Chinese carmakers. A total investment of 
US$ 6 billion is planned by 2010 to develop the infrastructure. The project in-
cludes not only manufacturing but also research and development facilities, a 
commercial centre, housing and even a new golf course. The aim of the Shang-
hai International Auto City is to become "an integrated auto industry base in 
China and Asia and an important platform for the cooperation and common de-
velopment of world auto industry” (http://www.rshautocity.com/carcity/english/ 
siacplanning_introduce.htm – downld. August 24, 2004).  
The vehicles and parts production zone is divided into two parks, Shanghai 
Volkswagen and SIAC Spare Parts Assembly Industrial Zone. According to the 
real estate developer more than 100 enterprises from all over the world will set 
up plants here. An educational park within the automobile system is planned to 
supply qualified personnel for SIAC. Tongji University, one of the prestigious 
universities in China, is setting up an automotive school here, and upon comple-
tion students will number some 15,000. (Ibidem) 
In brief, two differences are apparent between the automotive and infocom 
industries. First, development in carmaking lagged a decade behind, but can 
now draw on the experience and capabilities of regional policy makers; second, 
automotive industrial parks are more strongly shaped by regional development 
goals and adapted to regional OEM locations. 
                                            
19 The investigation on which this study is based addressed supplier structures for 
multinational carmakers in China and India. The findings were similar for both 
countries: “Manufacturing best practice has spread remarkably quickly to fist-tier 
suppliers in both India and China over the past decade … These practices have 
not as yet permeated through the lower tiers of the supply chain” (ibidem, 24). 
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 Figure 4: Layout of the Shanghai International Automobile City 
 
Source: http://www.shautocity.com/carcity/english/siacplanning_04.htm – downld. Au-
gust 24, 2004 
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 4. Reverberations on Industrial Actors in 
Germany 
As we have seen in this paper, the two industries seem to assign different roles 
to China in their global strategies. The automotive industry has been setting up 
its Chinese operations mainly to serve the Chinese market, and, in some cases, 
to become the hub for their regional strategy for East Asia. Due to the need to 
serve the automakers in China first or due to a lack of competitiveness in costs 
and quality at the current stage, automotive suppliers in China are also still fo-
cused on the national market. As we have seen, however, there are high expec-
tations of steeply rising export rates in the medium term. The exceptional case 
of Honda setting up an export-oriented factory aimed specifically at the Euro-
pean market can be seen as a sign that the regional strategy adopted by car-
makers might be for a transitional period only. 
The infocom industry has assigned China a central role in its global produc-
tion strategy. In this sector, Chinese locations are part of the transnational value 
chains of end producers and manufacturers for world markets. Processes in 
multinational companies’ home countries thus tend to compete directly with (po-
tential) Chinese processes. In the enlarged EU, competition is also developing 
with Eastern European locations, and a qualitative difference in corporate strat-
egy is still apparent. In contrast to multinational strategies for China, there is no 
clear trend towards developing competence centres in Eastern European loca-
tions. Outsourcing or offshoring activities seem rather designed to realise labour 
cost advantages while benefiting from a good level of education within the EU 
internal market. 
The relocation of employment from the company’s home country to China 
and other places meant, for example in the case of Siemens, that every sixth 
European job in 1999/2000 was in R&D, every third in sales and marketing, and 
only a third (37%) still in production. In 1970 63% of Siemens’ employees were 
still working in production. Today production accounts for only 31% of the work-
force, half of whom are qualified skilled workers. In comparison Siemens’ blue-
colour workforce makes up 59% in North America, 66% in Latin America, and 
59% in the Asia-Pacific region (Source: own interview, Siemens AG, 2002). 
Both strategies have a direct impact on working time and pay models at 
German locations. One example is the dispute at the Siemens AG plants in 
Kamp-Lintfort and Bocholt, where mobile telephones and digital cordless tele-
phones are made. Both products are under strong competition, also conducted 
through market pricing. A comparison of labour costs at these locations with 
those at a potential Hungarian site for outsourced production reveals a labour 
cost disadvantage of more than 30%. Faced with the alternative of accepting an 
adjustment to safeguard their jobs in Kamp-Lintfort – some 2500 employees 
were affected – a works agreement was reached to reintroduce the 40-hour 
week without pay compensation and waive the holiday allowance and Christ-
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 mas bonus. This reduced labour costs by about 30%. In return the company 
gave a two-year job guarantee. This internal company conflict was following 
with great attention by the media because it was in the nature of a pilot dispute.  
This deal is likely to be emulated by other companies such as Daimler-
Chrysler and VW, imposing wage settlements lower than industry-wide pay 
agreements at the plant level that take account of the competitive situation of 
the location – settlements which a few years ago would not have been accepted 
by labour and management. 
A statement by the CEO of Siemens AG is to be seen in this context: 
“Global competitiveness is one of the focal interests of the company man-
agement. Companies must constantly check whether their worldwide value 
chain it still right. This is just as true for development activities as for production 
sites and internal services. The times when it was a matter of building up and 
operating a complete value chain in practically every country are long since 
over. Today large-scale, cross-border solutions are wanted, best of all even 
global networks. This means that locations outside Germany are becoming 
more important. This in view of the fact that Siemens A.G. earns about 80% of 
its turnover with customers outside Germany while some 40% of value added is 
still generated in Germany. Regional value-added structure will certainly con-
tinue to adapt to regional business structure. To safeguard jobs in Germany, 
better underlying conditions are needed, i.e., lower labour costs and growth.” 
(Pierer in the Employees Journal “Siemens Welt”, No. 4, 2004) 
The result is pressure on labour costs in Germany. In this respect China 
looks like the ultimate low-wage location. The debate on locating in China has 
so far concentrated far too much on this angle however. It is only now that tap-
ping markets and the quality aspect are become more important arguments. 
The fact is that technological requirements have led to a very high degree 
of automation in electronics manufacturing in China, too. (cf. argumentation ear-
lier in the paper). 
What is more, developments in the capability standards affecting quality 
have been neglected. This aspect has been stressed in a study by Roland Ber-
ger Strategy Consultants that looked at the factors and motives driving the lat-
est wave of foreign off-shoring by Germany industrial enterprises.20 Companies 
mentioned not only the expected advantages in wages and salaries but espe-
cially the high manufacturing quality to be achieved in East Asian locations. 
83% of the companies questioned saw no change in conformance quality in 
comparison with German locations, 17% judged conformance quality to be be-
tween -1% and -10% below German standards, no one judged quality to be be-
low -10%. The most important causes stated were excellent training of produc-
tion personnel, high resource input for quality control, reworking directly during 
                                            
20  The study was conducted in the first quarter of 2004. The sample of 70 companies 
included the sectors general mechanical engineering, plant engineering and spe-
cial mechanical engineering, automotive components suppliers, and electronics, 
as well as microelectronics. 
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 production. Conformance quality at Chinese locations is therefore considered 
higher than in Eastern Europe. 60% of companies observed no difference in 
Eastern Europe, 30% detected a drop of between -1% and -10% from German 
quality standards, and in 10% of cases the difference was more than 10% (Ber-
ger 2004: 30, 32). 
These are our findings with regard to the infocom industry in China, too. A 
comparison of production quality and field call rates for a standard electro-
mechanical component used in mobile telephones offers a concrete example.  
One of the current world market leaders produces the identical product in 
large numbers at a location in Western Europe and at a location in China. The 
product was launched in lead production in Europe. With the expansion of the 
Chinese mobile telephony market and customer demand for national supply, a 
major proportion of capacity was transferred to a new Beijing location in 2003. 
At this site the component is produced for the Chinese and world markets in 
almost identical, highly automated processes. 
Figure 5: Performance Differences between a Chinese and a Western 
European Production Line for InfoCom Products 
 Jan. Feb. Mar. April May June July Aug.
Fall-off rate (FOR)*   
Chinese production line 
West European prod. line 
0.28
0.75
0.29
0.95
0.38
0.86
0.37
0.93
0.29
1.22
0.27 
1.11 
0.29 
0.81 
0.32
0.78
Overall efficiency (OEE)**   
Chinese production line 
West European prod. line 
71
80
71
81
72.2
84
75
80
79
83
78 
82 
76 
84 
76
85
Field call rate (FCR)***   
Chinese production line 
West European prod. line 
20
310
5
226
1
118
48
109
249
114
32 
344 
87 
77 
99
–
 
* FOR: fall-off rate. In this case faults in final stage of process 
** OEE: overall efficiency. Actual rate of utilisation of a line measured against an esti-
mated service life. 
*** FCR: field call rate. In this instance 0 hrs. loss of customer output measured in parts 
per million – ppm. 
Source: Own research 
A comparison of strategies pursued in production locations provides a first ex-
planation of this difference. To compensate for competitive disadvantages, 
German production locations have in recent years conducted sometimes rigor-
ous cost cutting programmes focussing, as usual, on indirect activities. Process-
supporting functions have also been affected. A lack of robustness in product 
and process design has been compensated with specialized personnel, for ex-
ample from development. In the face of uneconomic process ratios, accompa-
nying action is taken to compensate resource deficiencies, albeit it with a time 
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 lag. For instance, programmes such as the six sigma method (Rehbehn 2003) 
for developing robust products and processes are now being more frequently 
deployed, which permit operative personnel to manage the process alone while 
improving production yield. It is also coming to be recognised that greater ac-
count must be taken of transfers in the development of products and processes, 
i.e., not material and machines are to be transferred but demonstrably robust 
products and processes. 
Owing to low labour costs, process-supporting activities that compensate 
weaknesses in the manufacturing process are not an issue at Chinese loca-
tions. Indirect activities like incoming-lot and process control often require con-
siderable labour input. Operative quality assurance is part of the organisation 
and supports yield and product quality. It is only a question of time before these 
indirect activities constitute a significant pool of costs and are consequently sub-
jected to scrutiny. By this time, however, the demand for robustly developed 
and subsequently transferred products and processes will have been met, per-
mitting rationalization in Chinese production, as well. 
The two industries under study differ in one important point. 
Unlike in the motor vehicle industry and mechanical engineering, production 
in the electrical goods industry does not have core competence status. The high 
degree of standardisation in production processes we have described makes 
outsourcing an easy step to take. Firms like Ericsson, Siemens Mobil Networks, 
or Nokia have transferred parts or all of their production to contract manufactur-
ers. One consequence has been the rapid expansion of production locations 
together with just as rapid an increase in turnover for contract manufacturers. At 
the same time the multinational infocom companies spend little on modernising 
production at home. This tendency can also be observed in other industrial sec-
tors as Lay and Schirrmeister have shown. (Lay and Schirrmeister 2003) Reor-
ganising production can often be a more profitable path to take before outsourc-
ing at the current and not the attainable state of the art. 
While companies place great value on the development of new products, 
they pay far less attention to planning production. According to a study by the 
Fraunhofer-Institut für Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (ISI), personnel 
resources for planning production modernisation represent on average no more 
than 0.4% of the workforce. This is only one tenth of the staff employed in prod-
uct-related research and development. Mechanical engineering is bottom of the 
league with only 0.3% (Lay and Schirrmeister 2003).  
Modernisation of production is often undertaken only under constraint, for 
example when new products require process innovation. A lack of resources 
makes strategic planning almost impossible. Even firms that have put new 
products on the market in the past two years have not invested significantly 
more in modernising their production. Moreover, staff costs for process innova-
tion do not increase with a growing proportion of employees in research and 
development. This contradicts the widespread thesis that product and process 
innovation are necessarily closely linked. 
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 In the majority of cases, the head of production or the plant manager take 
on the planning work for modernising production. But they are often overbur-
dened by day-to-day business. The sparse resources for planning modernisa-
tion measures in production can be at least partly explained by these time bot-
tlenecks. 
On the evidence of such examples as Siemens Medical Solutions in Erlan-
gen and Forchheim, there can be no doubt that manufacturing in Germany that 
follows flexitime models, is geared to long capital utilization and the current or-
der situation, which integrates production closely into the supply chain and op-
erates with skilled labour trained under the German system of dual vocational 
training can hold its own in international competition. 
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 5. Summary and Conclusions 
As we have seen, China has been very attractive to multinational industrial en-
terprises that are busy restructuring their value chains in the current major up-
heaval. A range of factors come together: first, market developments with very 
high short-term growth rates as well as major long-term growth potential; sec-
ond, the availability of an “industrial reserve army” of well qualified labour 
unlikely to be depleted in the foreseeable future; and, third, a government sup-
port policy that provides not only financial incentives but also complex estab-
lishment support, as the example of industrial parks demonstrates. 
Spurred by China's accession to the WTO, more and more global players 
are setting up operations in China. Cooperation with multinational companies in 
China's socialist modernisation policy is seen as a primary means of increasing 
the competitiveness of its domestic industry. As we have shown in this paper, 
the new factories in China are as good or better in terms of performance and 
control over their industrial processes. However, this can be said almost without 
exception only for foreign firms that have set up their operations in China since 
the early 1990s. Chinese companies which have not entered a joint venture with 
foreign companies clearly lag still farther behind. 
The comparison between the infocom and automotive industries shows 
similarities and differences in the timing and the direction of their rush into 
China. While in the infocom sector, China is becoming a (the) worldwide pro-
duction platform for core components and finished products, the impact on 
global industrial process chains will be more limited in the case of the auto in-
dustry. Market and product characteristics in the automotive industry as well as 
the capabilities and cost levels of local manufacturers are limiting the develop-
ment of the Chinese automotive industry towards meeting the needs of the do-
mestic market and, to a certain degree, East Asian markets.  
The future is far from clear. There are obvious risks and many doubts about 
the sustainability of the Chinese rate of development. Nevertheless, the devel-
opment described in this paper poses tough challenges to manufacturing com-
panies and high-wage countries such as Germany. They will have to aim for 
even higher degrees of automation to offset higher labour costs, and they will 
have to further improve their process-chain mastery. This would reduce the 
costs of quality assurance which have strongly increased in proportion in recent 
years. Robust control processes have also to be introduced in indirect produc-
tion and in view of their increasing relevance in terms of costs, this could be 
turned into a real competitive advantage. Proximities to markets or to R&D ac-
tivities will not, as the example of infocom shows, secure a domestic manufac-
turing base. 
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